Lorraine Daston. Against Nature. [Book Review]

Philosophy in Review 39 (4):168-170 (2019)
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Abstract

In this short and highly readable monograph, the author aims to answer the age-old question of why humans construct moral orders grounded upon natural orders, deriving normative authority from divine or otherwise nonanthropomorphic sources in nature. Why, for instance, did the drafters of the U.S. Declaration of Independence invoke natural laws rather than simply relying on human reason and argument to ground their objections to British colonial rule? Answering this and related questions about the relationship between moral and natural orders demands a precise method. Daston describes hers as philosophical (not cultural) anthropology, probing the motivations behind the intellectual leap—often described as ‘the naturalistic fallacy’—from the natural to the normative (3). In that vein, her inquiry begins with a remark from Immanuel Kant’s underappreciated work Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View.

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Similar books and articles

Introduction. Doing what comes naturally.Lorraine Daston & Fernando Vidal - 2004 - In Lorraine Daston & Fernando Vidal (eds.), The Moral Authority of Nature. University of Chicago Press. pp. 1--23.
Curriculum Vitae of Lorraine Daston.Susan Neiman, Peter Galison & Wendy Doniger - 2016 - In Susan Neiman, Peter Galison & Wendy Doniger (eds.), What Reason Promises: Essays on Reason, Nature and History. De Gruyter. pp. 261-277.
Is There Value in Inconsistency?Christoph Engel Lorraine Daston (ed.) - 2006 - Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Mbh & Company.

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Shane Ralston
University of Ottawa (PhD)

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