Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (11-12):81-110 (2014)

Thomas Raleigh
University of Luxembourg
I consider a new, non-disjunctive strategy for ‘relational’ or ‘naïve realist’ theories to respond to arguments from ‘perfect’ (causally matching) hallucinations. The strategy, in a nutshell, is to treat such hypothetical cases as instances of perception rather than hallucination. After clarifying the form and dialectic of such arguments, I consider three objections to the strategy. I provide answers to the first two objections but concede that the third — based on the possibility of ‘chaotic’ (uncaused) perfect hallucinations — cannot obviously be dealt with by the proposed strategy. However, such ‘chaotic’ scenarios are also problematic for standard representational accounts of experience. Thus I conclude that perfect hallucinations pose no more of a threat to the relational theory than to its main representational rival.
Keywords Hallucination  Consciousness  Experience  Disjunctivism  Naive Realism  Argument from Hallucination  Perception  Philosophy of Mind
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References found in this work BETA

Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.
The Emperor’s New Mind.Roger Penrose - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
Reference and Consciousness.J. Campbell - 2002 - Oxford University Press.
Consciousness in Action.Susan L. Hurley - 1998 - Harvard University Press.
Perception and Its Objects.Bill Brewer - 2011 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Must Naive Realists Be Relationalists?Maarten Steenhagen - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (4):1002-1015.
Some Hallucinations Are Experiences of the Past.Michael Barkasi - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (3):454-488.
Philosophy of Perception and Liberal Naturalism.Thomas Raleigh - 2022 - In David Macarthur & Mario De Caro (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Liberal Naturalism. Routledge. pp. 299-319.
Fregean Particularism.Susanna Schellenberg - forthcoming - In Dirk Kindermann, Andy Egan & Peter Van Elswyk (eds.), Unstructured Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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