Gettier Problems and Logical Properties of Justification

Abstract

In the classical account of knowledge, S knows that P if and only if S believes that P, S is justified in believing that P, and P is true (JTB).. In 1963, Gettier presented two problems that casted doubt on this account. Since then, numerous authors proposed modifications or clarifications of JTB, however, these efforts have not produced a satis-factory solution. In this paper, the focus is on logical properties of justification. The Get-tier problem Case II is expressed in sentential logic and Gettier Minimal Assumption (GMA) is introduced. It is shown that Gettier must have used GMA or some other as-sumption that entails GMA in his construction of Case II. Rejection of GMA solves Get-tier problem Case II and it is a step towards a better understanding of the logical proper-ties of justification and knowledge.

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Vaclav Rajlich
Wayne State University

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