Welfare over Time and the Case for Holism

Philosophical Papers 41 (2):239 - 265 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Abstract Theories of personal well-being are typically developed so that they render verdicts on (a) how well-off a person is at a moment, (b) how well-off a person is over an interval of time, and (c) how good a whole life is for the person who lives it. Conative theories of welfare posit welfare-atoms that consist, e.g., in episodes of desire-satisfaction, aim-achievement, or values-realisation. Most extant conative theories are additive: they compute well-being over time - up to and including the value of a whole life - by adding up the values of these welfare atoms. Here, it is shown that such atomistic, additive conative theories do not always generate plausible verdicts on (b) and (c) above. They imply that lives featuring incoherent plans and rapidly changing projects go surprisingly well for those who lived them. Holistic theories of well-being are often thought to provide a solution to problems like these. However, one of the best-known versions of welfare holism within the conative family, Rawls? rational life-preferentism, is based on the problematic assumption that there is one ideal life plan for each person. This paper presents a new form of paradigm-resemblance based conative holism that does not make this assumption and that explains the limits of additivity

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Health and well-being.Jason Raibley - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):469-489.
Well-Being and the Priority of Values.Jason Raibley - 2010 - Social Theory and Practice 36 (4):593-620.
Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure and Welfare.Chris Heathwood - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:79-106.
The Strong-Tie Requirement and Objective-List Theories of Well-Being.William A. Lauinger - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):953-968.
Preferentism and the paradox of desire.Bradford Skow - 2009 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2009 (3):1-17.
Welfare, happiness, and ethics.L. W. Sumner - 1996 - New York: Oxford University Press.
A paradox for some theories of welfare.Ben Bradley - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (1):45 - 53.
Health and Welfare in Animals and Humans.Lennart Nordenfelt - 2011 - Acta Biotheoretica 59 (2):139-152.
Fitting attitudes and welfare.Chris Heathwood - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:47-73.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-06-21

Downloads
78 (#193,729)

6 months
6 (#201,673)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jason R. Raibley
University of Kansas

Citations of this work

Values, Agency, and Welfare.Jason R. Raibley - 2013 - Philosophical Topics 41 (1):187-214.
Can Subjectivism Account for Degrees of Wellbeing?Willem van der Deijl & Huub Brouwer - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (3):767-788.
A new well‐being atomism.Gil Hersch & Daniel Weltman - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107 (1):3-23.
Ethics, knowledge, and a procedural approach to wellbeing.Søren Harnow Klausen - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (1):31-47.
Do Good Lives Make Good Stories?Amy Berg - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (2):637-659.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references