Narrative, Identity and Moral Philosophy

Philosophical Papers 32 (3):261-277 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX


I distinguish what I call ?minimal narrative? from narrative of the kind that might disclose a person's identity in biography or autobiography. The latter exists in what I call ?the realm of meaning?; a realm in which, in ways I try to make clear, form and content cannot be separated. The realm of meaning is also the realm in which we develop an understanding of what it means to lead a human life lucidly responsive to the defining facts of the human condition and, interdependently with that, our sense of what it means to wrong someone. To show to what degree assumptions about the realm of meaning set the stage for our understanding of what it is to wrong someone, of the nature of biography and autobiography and of what it is to learn morally from someone's example, I detail the conceptual structure of a certain kind of racist perception. The racist's distinction between ?us? and ?them?, is essentially the distinction between lives that are lived in the realm of meaning and lives that are not. Much of moral philosophy, I argue, takes as it starting point a perception of human life that is little different from the racist's perception of the lives of those whom he regards as less than fully human



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,150

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles


Added to PP

145 (#129,747)

6 months
18 (#142,791)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Personal Identity and Ethics.David Shoemaker - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
ACKNOWLEDGING OTHERS.Talbot Brewer - 2021 - Journal of Ethical Reflections 1 (4):91-119.
Idealist Origins: 1920s and Before.Martin Davies & Stein Helgeby - 2014 - In Graham Oppy & Nick Trakakis (eds.), History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer. pp. 15-54.
Is There a Duty to Read the News?Amy Berg - 2022 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 20 (3-4):243-267.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references