Philosophical Studies 165 (2):469-489 (2013)

Authors
Jason R. Raibley
University of Kansas
Abstract
Eudaimonistic theorists of welfare have recently attacked conative accounts of welfare. Such accounts, it is claimed, are unable to classify states normally associated with physical and emotional health as non-instrumentally good and states associated with physical and psychological damage as non-instrumentally bad. However, leading eudaimonistic theories such as the self-fulfillment theory and developmentalism have problems of their own. Furthermore, conative theorists can respond to this challenge by dispositionalizing their theories, i.e., by saying that it is not merely the realization of one’s values that is non-instrumentally good for one, but that the disposition to realize one’s values is also non-instrumentally good for one. This approach, properly elaborated, can accommodate the idea that, in many cases, states normally associated with physical and psychological health (or unhealth) are non-instrumentally good (or bad). It also preserves the many well-known advantages of conative theories
Keywords Welfare  Well-being  Health  Eudaimonia  Eudaimonism  Conative theories of welfare  Flourishing  Dispositions
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9951-2
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,257
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - New York: Basic Books.
Nicomachean Ethics.H. Aristotle & Rackham - 1968 - Harvard University Press.
Mortal Questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - Cambridge University Press.

View all 64 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Mental Health Without Well-Being.Sam Wren-Lewis & Anna Alexandrova - 2021 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 46 (6):684-703.
Happiness.Dan Haybron - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Values, Agency, and Welfare.Jason R. Raibley - 2013 - Philosophical Topics 41 (1):187-214.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Welfare Over Time and the Case for Holism.Jason R. Raibley - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (2):239 - 265.
The Value of Imaginativeness.James Grant - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):275-289.
Physical Beauty: Only Skin Deep?Medard T. Hilhorst - 2002 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 5 (1):11-21.
True Belief is Not Instrumentally Valuable.Chase B. Wrenn - 2010 - In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave-Macmillan.
A Theory of Health and Disease: The Objectivist-Subjectivist Dichotomy.Robert M. Sade - 1995 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 20 (5):513-525.
Why 'Health' is Not a Central Category for Public Health Policy.Stephen John - 2009 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (2):129-143.
The Missing-Desires Objection to Hybrid Theories of Well-Being.William Lauinger - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):270-295.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-05-30

Total views
119 ( #97,197 of 2,499,869 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #277,946 of 2,499,869 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes