Borderline cases and bivalence

Philosophical Review 114 (1):1-31 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is generally agreed that vague predicates like ‘red’, ‘rich’, ‘tall’, and ‘bald’, have borderline cases of application. For instance, a cloth patch whose color lies midway between a definite red and a definite orange is a borderline case for ‘red’, and an American man five feet eleven inches in height is (arguably) a borderline case for ‘tall’. The proper analysis of borderline cases is a matter of dispute, but most theorists of vagueness agree at least in the thought that borderline cases for vague predicate ‘ ’ are items whose satisfaction of ‘ ’ is in some sense unclear or problematic: it is unclear whether or not the patch is red, unclear whether or not the man is tall.1 For example, Lynda Burns cites a widespread view as holding that borderline cases “are not definitely within the positive or negative extension of the predicate. … Border- line cases are seen as falling within a gap between the cases of definite application of the predicate and cases of definite application of its negation” (1995, 30). Michael Tye writes that the “concept of a border- line case is the concept of a case that is neither definitely in nor defi- nitely out” (1994b, 18).

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,227

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Demoting higher-order vagueness.Diana Raffman - 2009 - In Sebastiano Moruzzi & Richard Dietz (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press. pp. 509--22.
How to Respond to Borderline Cases.Dan López de Sa - 2010 - In Sebastiano Moruzzi & Richard Dietz (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Oxford University Press.
Disjunctive Predicates.David H. Sanford - 1993 - American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (2):167-1722.
Truth, Falsity, and Borderline Cases.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (1):211-244.
Just what is vagueness?Otávio Bueno & Mark Colyvan - 2012 - Ratio 25 (1):19-33.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
249 (#82,216)

6 months
53 (#86,233)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Diana Raffman
University of Toronto, St. George Campus

References found in this work

Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - New York: Routledge.
Vagueness, truth and logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.
Blindspots.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Languages and language.David K. Lewis - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing about language. New York: Routledge. pp. 3-35.

View all 44 references / Add more references