Personal Autonomy, Decisional Capacity, and Mental Disorder

In Lubomira Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this Introduction, I situate the underlying project “Autonomy and Mental Disorder” with reference to current debates on autonomy in moral and political philosophy, and the philosophy of action. I then offer an overview of the individual contributions. More specifically, I begin by identifying three points of convergence in the debates at issue, stating that autonomy is: 1) a fundamentally liberal concept; 2) an agency concept and; 3) incompatible with (severe) mental disorder. Next, I explore, in the context of decisional capacity assessments, the difficulties to reconcile 1) and 2) with 3) which they at the same time seem to imply. Having clarified the centrality of a cogent notion of mental disorder for addressing these difficulties, I comment on three promising lines of inquiry about the nature and scope of autonomy that emerge from the following chapters.

Similar books and articles

Autonomy and Mental Disorder.Lubomira Radoilska (ed.) - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
Autonomy, Value and the First Person.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2012 - In Lubomira Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press.
Clarifying Capacity: Reasons and Value.Jules Holroyd - forthcoming - In Lubomira Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Health. Oxford University Press.
The Concept of Mental Disorder: A Proposal.Alfredo Gaete - 2008 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 15 (4):327-339.
Mental disorder and values.Bengt Brülde - 2007 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 93-102.
Why the mental disorder concept matters.Dusan Kecmanovic - 2011 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 4 (1):1-9.
Autonomy and Neuroscience.Alfred Mele - 2012 - In L. Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-06-05

Downloads
762 (#18,664)

6 months
64 (#60,259)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals.Immanuel Kant - 1785 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Thomas E. Hill & Arnulf Zweig.
Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Unprincipled virtue: an inquiry into moral agency.Nomy Arpaly - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Natural goodness.Philippa Foot - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational action: studies in philosophy and social science. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.

View all 26 references / Add more references