Lubomira Radoilska
University of Kent
This article offers an account of akrasia as a primary failure of intentional agency in contrast to a recent account of weakness of will, developed by Richard Holton, that also points to a kind of failure of intentional agency but presents this as both separate from akrasia and more fundamental than it. Drawing on Aristotle’s work, it is argued that the failure of intentional agency articulated by the concept of akrasia is the central case, whereas the phenomenon Holton’s account is after, referred to as ‘ordinary weakness of will’, is best understood as an unsuccessful attempt to tackle akrasia and, more specifically, a secondary failure of intentional agency.
Keywords akrasia   Aristotle   intentional action   inverse akrasia   motivation   practical syllogism  reasons for action   planning   value
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DOI 10.21555/top.v0i43.31
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Freedom and Reason.Richard Mervyn Hare - 1963 - Oxford, Clarendon Press.
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Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality.Jon Elster (ed.) - 1979 - Editions De La Maison des Sciences De L'Homme.

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