Russellian typing knowledge and Fitch's paradox of knowability

In Jean-Yves Beziau, Alexandre Costa-Leite & Itala M. Loffredo D’Ottaviano (eds.), Aftermath of the Logical Paradise. pp. 401-423 (2017)
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Abstract

It is already known that Fitch's paradox of knowability can be solved by typing knowledge. I differentiate two kinds of such typing, Tarskian and Russellian, and focus on the latter which is framed within the ramified theory of types. My main aim is to other a defence of the approach against recently raised criticism. The key justification is provided by the Vicious Circle Principle which governs the very formation of propositions and thus also intensional operators, including the operator of knowledge.

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Jiri Raclavsky
Masaryk University

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