The Value of Existence

In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson, The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. New York NY: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 424-444 (2015)
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Abstract

Can it be better or worse for a person to exist than not to exist at all? This old and challenging existential question has been raised anew in contemporary moral philosophy, mainly for two reasons. First, traditional “impersonal” ethical theories, such as utilitarianism, have counterintuitive implications in population ethics, for example, the repugnant conclusion. Second, it has seemed evident to many that an outcome can be better than another only if it is better for someone, and that only moral theories that are in this sense “person affecting” can be correct. The implications of this Person-Affecting Restriction will differ radically, however, depending on which answer one gives to the existential question. The negative answer, which we argue against, would make the restriction quite untenable. Hence, many of the problems regarding our moral duties to future generations turn around the issue at hand.

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Author Profiles

Gustaf Arrhenius
Stockholm University
Wlodek Rabinowicz
Lund University

Citations of this work

Social choice ethics in artificial intelligence.Seth D. Baum - 2020 - AI and Society 35 (1):165-176.
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Person-affecting utilitarianism.Ralf M. Bader - 2022 - In Gustaf Arrhenius, Krister Bykvist, Tim Campbell & Elizabeth Finneron-Burns, The Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 251-270.

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