Abstract
Man’s intellectual capacity remains an enigma, as it is both the subject and the means of analysis. If one is to assume quantum-wave dualism in physics then the state of the world depends on the instruments we use for observation. The “paradoxical” nature of investigating human cognition may thus bear inherent limitations. However, studying cognitive models may be less of a seemingly inconsistent endeavor, if “contradictions” may be classified. In this brief exposition, a variety of aspects related to cognitive models are discussed. The authors maintain that modeling the functional “paradoxical nature” of human cognition remains the greatest challenge. Therefore, consciousness aside, models of conscious systems, or rather conscious models of conscious systems, are the main objects of exploration. While intentional systems may seem a good starting point for such an exploration, they lack two important constructs: volition and reflexion. Both concepts, and especially volition, unlike rationality for example, are less discussed in the discourse of cognitive models. Although not devoted to volition or reflexion, this work proposes an increased research interest in these areas.
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References found in this work BETA

Vision.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.
Unified Theories of Cognition.Allen Newell - 1990 - Harvard University Press.
Computing Machinery and Intelligence.Alan M. Turing - 1950 - Mind 59 (October):433-60.

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