Naturalism; Or, Living Within One's Means

Dialectica 49 (2‐4):251-263 (1995)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Naturalism holds that there is no higher access to truth than empirically testable hypotheses. Still it does not repudiate untestable hypotheses. They fill out interstices of theory and lead to further hypotheses that are testable.A hypothesis is tested by deducing, from it and a background of accepted theory, some observation categorical that does not follow from the background alone. This categorical, a generalized conditional compounded of two observation sentences, admits in turn of a primitive experimental test.The observation sentences themselves, like ape cries and bird calls, are in holophrastic association with ranges of neural intake. Denotation of determinate objects figures neither in this association nor in deducing the categorical from the scientific hypotheses. Hence the indeterminacy of reference; ontology is purely auxiliary to the structure of theory. Truth, however, is seen still as transcendent at least in this sense: we say of a superseded scientific theory not that it ceased to be true, but that it is found to have been false

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,322

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Normativity in Quine's naturalism: The technology of truth-seeking? [REVIEW]Wybo Houkes - 2002 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 33 (2):251-267.
Naturalism without representationalism.Huw Price - 2004 - In Mario De Caro & David Macarthur (eds.), Naturalism in Question. Harvard University Press. pp. 71--88.
Quine's naturalism.Alan Weir - 2013 - In Gilbert Harman & Ernie Lepore (eds.), A Companion to W. V. O. Quine. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 114-147.
The two faces of Quine's naturalism.Susan Haack - 1993 - Synthese 94 (3):335 - 356.
Half-hearted naturalism.John Dewey - 1927 - Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):57-64.
Naturalizzazione: vie e ostacoli.Alberto Peruzzi - 2012 - Annali Del Dipartimento di Filosofia 18:217-254.
Three sorts of naturalism.Hans Fink - 2006 - European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):202–221.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-11-21

Downloads
95 (#177,295)

6 months
11 (#226,803)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

On Characterizing Metaphysical Naturalism.Lok-Chi Chan - 2021 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind 1:232-260.
Quine on the Nature of Naturalism.Sander Verhaegh - 2017 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):96-115.
In defense of naturalism.Gregory W. Dawes - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (1):3-25.

View all 47 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references