Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science

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Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2353-2372 (2018)
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Abstract

Dispositionalism about belief has had a recent resurgence. In this paper we critically evaluate a popular dispositionalist program pursued by Eric Schwitzgebel. Then we present an alternative: a psychofunctional, representational theory of belief. This theory of belief has two main pillars: that beliefs are relations to structured mental representations, and that the relations are determined by the generalizations under which beliefs are acquired, stored, and changed. We end by describing some of the generalizations regarding belief acquisition, storage, and change.

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10.1007/s11098-017-0962-x

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Author Profiles

Jake Quilty-Dunn
Rutgers - New Brunswick
Eric Mandelbaum
CUNY Graduate Center

Citations of this work

Perceptual Pluralism.Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2019 - Noûs 54 (4):807-838.
The Fragmentation of Belief.Joseph Bendana & Eric Mandelbaum - 2021 - In Cristina Borgoni, Dirk Kindermann & Andrea Onofri (eds.), The Fragmented Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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References found in this work

Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation.Donald Davidson - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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