Philosophical Studies 170 (3):501-524 (2014)

Hsueh Qu
National University of Singapore
The inoffensive title of Section 1.4.7 of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, ‘Conclusion of this Book’, belies the convoluted treatment of scepticism contained within. It is notoriously difficult to decipher Hume’s considered response to scepticism in this section, or whether he even has one. In recent years, however, one line of interpretation has gained popularity in the literature. The ‘usefulness and agreeableness reading’ (henceforth U&A) interprets Hume as arguing in THN 1.4.7 that our beliefs and/or epistemic policies are justified via their usefulness and agreeableness to the self and others; proponents include Ardal (in Livingston & King (eds.) Hume: a re-evaluation, 1976), Kail (in: Frasca-Spada & Kail (eds.) Impressions of Hume, 2005), McCormick (Hume Stud 31:1, 2005), Owen (Hume’s reason, 1999), and Ridge (Hume Stud 29:2, 2003), while Schafer (Philosophers, forthcoming) also defends an interpretation along these lines. In this paper, I will argue that although U&A has textual merit, it struggles to maintain a substantive distinction between epistemic and moral justification—a distinction that Hume insists on. I then attempt to carve out the logical space for there being a distinctly epistemic notion of justification founded on usefulness and agreeableness. However, I find that such an account is problematic for two reasons: first, it cannot take advantage of the textual support for U&A; secondly, it is incompatible with other features of the text
Keywords Early Modern Philosophy  Hume  Scepticism  Normativity
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0260-1
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References found in this work BETA

Hume's Reason.David Owen - 1999 - Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
Cognition and Commitment in Hume’s Philosophy.Don Garrett - 1997 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):191-196.

View all 20 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Laying Down Hume's Law.Hsueh Qu - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):24-46.
Hume's Internalist Epistemology in EHU 12.Hsueh Qu - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):517-539.
Hume’s Doxastic Involuntarism.Hsueh Qu - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):53-92.
Excuses for Hume's Skepticism.Yuval Avnur - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):264-306.
Prescription, Description, and Hume's Experimental Method.Hsueh Qu - 2016 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (2):279-301.

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