Authors
Hsueh Qu
National University of Singapore
Abstract
Hume argues that whenever we seem to be motivated by reason, there are unnoticed calm passions that play this role instead, a move is that is often criticised as ad hoc (e.g. Stroud 1977 and Cohon 2008). In response, some commentators propose a conceptual rather than empirical reading of Hume’s conativist thesis, either as a departure from Hume (Stroud 1977), or as an interpretation or rational reconstruction (Bricke 1996). I argue that conceptual accounts face a dilemma: either they render the conativist thesis trivial, or they violate Hume's thesis that 'a priori, any thing may produce any thing'. I defend an empirical construal of Hume’s conativist thesis. I provide two theoretical frameworks within which Hume’s appeal to the calm passions may be justified: first, by the framework of theoretical virtues, and secondly, by lights of his own ‘rules by which to judge of causes and effects’ (THN 1.3.15).
Keywords Hume  Conativism  Motivation  Passions  Simplicity  Theoretical Virtues
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Hume’s (Ad Hoc?) Appeal to the Calm Passions.Hsueh Qu - 2018 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 100 (4):444-469.
The Moral Sentiments in Hume’s Treatise.Åsa Carlson - 2014 - Hume Studies 40 (1):73-94.
Hume's Theory of Motivation.Daniel Shaw - 1989 - Hume Studies 15 (1):163-183.
The Simple Duality: Humean Passions.Hsueh Qu - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (S1):98-116.
Acali and Acid, Oil and Vinegar: Hume on Contrary Passions.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2017 - In Robert Stern & Alix Cohen (eds.), Thinking about the Emotions : A Philosophical History. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 150-171.
Hume, Passion, and Action.Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hume on the Stoic Rational Passions and "Original Existences".Jason R. Fisette - 2017 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 55 (4):609-639.
David Hume on Reason, Passions and Morals.A. Nuyen - 1984 - Hume Studies 10 (1):26-45.
Hume’s Reasons.Aaron Zimmerman - 2007 - Hume Studies 33 (2):211-256.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2021-01-27

Total views
61 ( #187,147 of 2,506,374 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
23 ( #38,780 of 2,506,374 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes