Does the physicalist have to fold his hand in admitting that Mary gains new knowledge, or can he accommodate this intuition and still maintain that all facts are physical facts?

PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 16 (1):20-23 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Does the physicalist have to fold his hand in admitting that Mary gains new knowledge, or can he accommodate this intuition and still maintain that all facts are physical facts?

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,593

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Epistemological physicalism and the knowledge argument.Jesper Kallestrup - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):1-23.
Acquaintance with qualia.John Bigelow & Robert Pargetter - 1990 - Theoria 61 (3):129-147.
A limited defense of the knowledge argument.Torin Alter - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 90 (1):35-56.
The Knowledge Argument and Phenomenal Concepts.Luca Malatesti - 2012 - Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Press.
How to be a (sort of) A Priori physicalist.D. Gene Witmer - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (1):185-225.
Physicalism could be true even if Mary learns something new.Barbara Montero - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):176-189.
Why I am not a dualist.Karen Bennett - 2021 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind 1:208-231.
Introduction to There's Something About Mary.Daniel Stoljar & Yujin Nagasawa - 2004 - In Peter Ludlow, Daniel Stoljar & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), There's Something About Mary. Cambridge, MA:
Atemporality and the mode of divine knowledge.Gregory Ganssle - 1993 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 34 (3):171 - 180.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-02-05

Downloads
36 (#385,000)

6 months
1 (#1,040,386)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.

View all 15 references / Add more references