Distinguishing between the computational and dynamical hypotheses: What difference makes the difference?
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):649-650 (1998)
Abstract
Van Gelder seeks to distinguish between the computational and the dynamical hypotheses primarily on the basis of ontic criteria – the kind of systems cognitive agents really are. I suggest that this meets with mixed success. By shifting to epistemic criteria – what kind of explanations we require to understand cognitive agents – I suggest there is an easier and more intuitive way to distinguish between these two competing views of cognitive agents.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1017/s0140525x98471735
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