Economics and Philosophy 18 (1):141-156 (2002)

James Griffin (1986, 1997, 2000) and Ruth Chang (1997) have argued that alternatives (and values) can be comparable when it is neither true that one is better than the other, nor true that they are exactly equal in value. The relation which holds between them has gone under various names: the alternatives are (Griffin) or (Chang). In this paper, I give a formal analysis of this relation. This analysis allows us to distinguish between two slightly different notions of . It is argued that the distinction between these notions is important for discussions of rationality, as is the distinction between or and incomparability
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DOI 10.1017/S0266267102001116
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On Parity and the Intuition of Neutrality.Mozaffar Qizilbash - 2018 - Economics and Philosophy 34 (1):87-108.
Is Incomparability a Problem for Anyone?Nien-hê Hsieh - 2007 - Economics and Philosophy 23 (1):65-80.

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