Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):171-184 (2008)

Authors
Rolf Reber
University of Oslo
Rolf Reber
University of Oslo
Abstract
Zeki and co-workers recently proposed that perception can best be described as locally distributed, asynchronous processes that each create a kind of microconsciousness, which condense into an experienced percept. The present article is aimed at extending this theory to metacognitive feelings. We present evidence that perceptual fluency—the subjective feeling of ease during perceptual processing—is based on speed of processing at different stages of the perceptual process. Specifically, detection of briefly presented stimuli was influenced by figure-ground contrast, but not by symmetry or the font of the stimuli. Conversely, discrimination of these stimuli was influenced by whether they were symmetric and by the font they were presented in , but not by figure-ground contrast. Both tasks however were related with the subjective experience of fluency . We conclude that subjective fluency is the conscious phenomenal correlate of different processing stages in visual perception
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DOI 10.1016/j.concog.2007.07.001
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Recognizing: The Judgment of Previous Occurrence.George Mandler - 1980 - Psychological Review 87 (3):252-271.

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