Where is the free agency in personal agency?

Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):630-632 (2011)
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Abstract

According to Jonathan Lowe's ‘Personal Agency’, free actions begin with a volition or act of will, which is itself a freely performed action. However, Lowe's explanation of why volitions are free actions is viciously circular: he argues that volitions qualify as free actions because they are rationally explicable, but claims that an action can only be rationally explicable if it is freely performed

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10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.705.x

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Christopher George Pulman
University of Reading

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