Accessibilism and the Challenge from Implicit Bias

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (3):421-434 (2015)
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Abstract

Recent research in social psychology suggests that many beliefs are formed as a result of implicit biases in favour of members of certain groups and against members of other groups. This article argues that beliefs of this sort present a counterexample to accessibilism in epistemology because the position cannot account for how the epistemic status of a belief that is the result of an implicit bias can differ from that of a counterpart belief that is the result of an unbiased response to the available evidence.

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Accessibilism and the Challenge from Implicit Bias.Katherine Puddifoot - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (3):421-434.
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Katherine Puddifoot
Durham University

Citations of this work

The Evil Demon Inside.Nicholas Silins - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):325-343.
Reading the bad news about our minds.Nicholas Silins - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):293-310.

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References found in this work

An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.John Locke - 1979 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 169 (2):221-222.
Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge.Laurence Bonjour - 1980 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):53-73.
Justification and truth.Stewart Cohen - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 46 (3):279--95.

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