Tracking the real: Through thick and thin

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (3):393-409 (2004)
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Abstract

In this paper, I examine Azzouni's tracking requirement and its use as a normative constraint on theories about objects which we take as real. I focus on what he calls ‘thick epistemic access’ and argue that there is a logical–conceptual sense in which thick access to the real presupposes thin access to it. Then, I move on to advance an alternative—Sellarsian—way to ontic commitment and show that (a) it is better than Azzouni's, and (b) it can accommodate thick epistemic access as a bonus. Finally, I try to defend the Quinean theoretical virtues against some of Azzouni's objections. Introduction Theoretical irrealism vs holistic realism On the epistemic authority of observation The myth of the levels Quinean virtues Conclusion.

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Stathis Psillos
University of Athens

Citations of this work

Choosing the realist framework.Stathis Psillos - 2011 - Synthese 180 (2):301 - 316.
Is There a Place for Epistemic Virtues in Theory Choice?Milena Ivanova - 2014 - In Abrol Fairweather (ed.), Virtue Epistemology Naturalized. Springer, Cham. pp. 207-226.
Virtues in Scientific Practice.Dana Tulodziecki - 2021 - In Emanuele Ratti & Tom Stapleford (eds.), Science, Technology, and Virtues: Contemporary Perspectives. Oxford University Press.

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References found in this work

Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Empiricism and the philosophy of mind.Wilfrid Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind.Paul M. Churchland (ed.) - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Saving the phenomena.James Bogen & James Woodward - 1988 - Philosophical Review 97 (3):303-352.

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