Predictive similarity and the success of science: A reply to Stanford

Philosophy of Science 68 (3):346-355 (2001)
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Abstract

P. Kyle Stanford (2000) attempts to offer a truth-linked explanation of the success of science which, he thinks, can be welcome to antirealists. He proposes an explanation of the success of a theory T1 in terms of its predictive similarity to the true theory T of the relevant domain. After raising some qualms about the supposed antirealist credentials of Stanford's account, I examine his explanatory story in some detail and show that it fails to offer a satisfactory explanation of the success of science

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10.1086/392888

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Stathis Psillos
University of Athens

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An antirealist explanation of the success of science.P. Kyle Stanford - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (2):266-284.

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