Some Recent Progress on the Cosmological Argument

Abstract

In the first chapter of Romans, Paul tells us that the power and deity of God are evident from what he has created. One reading of this is that there is an argument from the content of what has been created. Thus, the Book of Wisdom, which may well have been the source of Paul’s ideas here, says that “from the greatness and beauty of created things their original author, by analogy, is seen” (13:5, NAB). This is a kind of teleological or design argument. But one might also argue instead from general features of the universe, such as the fact that there is a universe at all, or that there are contingent states of affairs, or that there is motion. Alternately, one might argue from something extremely specific, but where the details do not matter, such as the conjunction of all contingent facts. The general strategy of cosmological arguments is to take a grand feature of the world, and then argue, abstracting from much of its specific content, that the best or only possible explanation is a First Cause, an entity that stands at the head of a causal chain leading to the occurrence of the existential feature. Typically, the grand feature is something the opponent will not challenge. Instead, opponents tend to ask: 1. Does the grand feature actually have an explanation? 2. Can there be an explanation not involving a First Cause? 3. Need the First Cause be God? Recent discussion has particularly focused on the first two questions, and I wish to primarily focus on the first question myself in this talk. But first a few words about progress on the second and third question, in reverse order.

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Alexander R. Pruss
Baylor University

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