Lies and Dishonest Endorsements

Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 84:213-222 (2010)
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Abstract

I shall discuss the problem of the definition of lying and the formulation of the duty of truthtelling. I shall argue that the morality of assertion is a special case of the morality of endorsement, and that a criterion of adequacy for an account of lying is that it handles certain cases of dishonest endorsement as well. Standardviews of lying fail to do so. I shall offer an account of the duty of honest endorsement in terms of the intention to avoid falsehood. But, in the end, we may simplyhave reason to go back to the naïve view that lying is saying falsehoods.

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Alexander R. Pruss
Baylor University

Citations of this work

Sincerely Asserting What You Do Not Believe.Alexander R. Pruss - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):541 - 546.

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