Religious Studies 47 (2):257-264 (2011)

Authors
Alexander R. Pruss
Baylor University
Abstract
Some, notably Peter van Inwagen, in order to avoid problems with free will and omniscience, replace the condition that an omniscient being knows all true propositions with a version of the apparently weaker condition that an omniscient being knows all knowable true propositions. I shall show that the apparently weaker condition, when conjoined with uncontroversial claims and the logical closure of an omniscient being's knowledge, still yields the claim that an omniscient being knows all true propositions.
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DOI 10.1017/S0034412510000144
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References found in this work BETA

``What Does an Omniscient Being Know About the Future?&Quot.Peter van Inwagen - 2008 - In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 216-230.

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Citations of this work BETA

Foreknowledge and Free Will.Linda Zagzebski - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:online.
Transworld Depravity and Divine Omniscience.Sean Meslar - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3):205-218.

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