Why Does Time Seem to Pass?

Abstract

According to the B-theory, the passage of time is an illusion. The B-theory therefore requires an explanation of this illusion before it can be regarded as fullysatisfactory; yet very few B-theorists have taken up the challenge of trying to provide one. In this paper I take some first steps toward such an explanation by first making a methodological proposal, then a hypothesis about a key element in the phenomenology of temporal passage. The methodological proposal focuses onthe representational content of the element of experience by virtue of which time seems to pass. The hypothesis involves the claim that the experience of changeinvolves the representation of something enduring, rather than perduring, through any change

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-03-19

Downloads
1,229 (#4,855)

6 months
68 (#11,129)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Simon Prosser
University of St. Andrews

References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - London, England: Dover Publications.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.

View all 85 references / Add more references

Citations of this work

Explaining Temporal Qualia.Matt Farr - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-24.
Do We (Seem to) Perceive Passage?Christoph Hoerl - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):188-202.
Relativity, the Open Future, and the Passage of Time.Oliver Pooley - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):321-363.

View all 39 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles