Abstract

The article investigates the use of the term “Law” in Richard Rorty and suggests an alternative use of the word. Although Rorty’s anti-foundationalism and antirepresentationalism are well known specially in relation to the metaphysical grounds of the human sciences, I argue that he would employ the term “law” in important rhetorical contexts. The text proposes to identify some aspects of the Rortyan Approach to “law” and, at the same time, focuses on the environment and the professional activity of the jurists in this context. At the end, I suggest a different use of the term, in the sense of a literary and conversational art (an artistic ability). This use of the term shall be understood as a provisional suggestion for narrative purposes and seems to partly escape a rigorous Rortyan view. If the practice of law was for the romans not only a “science”, but also an “art” (ars), so it can be for those that act in the juridical practice today a practice of prudence qua art.