Three Norms of Assertibility, or How the Moa became Extinct

Noûs 32 (S12):241 - 254 (1998)
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Abstract

holds for all central declarative sentences. According to deflationists, the key to an understanding of truth lies in an appreciation of the grammatical advantages of a predicate satisfying DS. As Paul Horwich puts it, “our truth predicate is merely a logical device enabling simple formulations of certain sorts of generalization.” (1996, p. 878; see also Horwich 1990)

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Huw Price
University of Bonn

Citations of this work

Faultless Disagreement.Max Kolbel - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):53-73.
Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.
Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.
Ecumenical alethic pluralism.Filippo Ferrari & Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):368-393.
The many (yet few) faces of deflationism.Jeremy Wyatt - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly (263):362-382.

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References found in this work

Truth.Paul Horwich - 1990 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. Edited by Frank Jackson & Michael Smith.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1999 - In Meaning. Oxford University Press. pp. 261-272.
Facts and the function of truth.Huw Price - 1988 - New York, NY, USA: Blackwell.
Facts and the Function of Truth.Huw Price - 1990 - Mind 99 (394):301-305.
Realism Minus Truth. [REVIEW]Paul Horwich - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):877-881.

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