Sidgwick’s Practical Ethics

International Journal of Applied Philosophy 12 (2):147-151 (1998)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In contrast to The Methods of Ethics, Sidgwick’s Practical Ethics counsels not trying to “get to the bottom of things” in our efforts to reach “some results of value for practical guidance and life.” For Sidgwick, both practical and theoretical ethics should start from the Morality of Common Sense. Although he retained his utilitarian outlook in Practical Ethics, this paper suggests that the Morality of Common Sense has the resources to hold its own against utilitarian revision.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Sidgwick’s Practical Ethics.Michael S. Pritchard - 1998 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 12 (2):147-151.
Sidgwick’s Impractical Ethics.Michael Davis - 1998 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 12 (2):153-159.
Sidgwick’s Impractical Ethics.Michael Davis - 1998 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 12 (2):153-159.
Utilitarian Practical Ethics: Sidgwick and Singer.Anthony Skelton - 2011 - In Placido Bucolo, Roger Crisp & Bart Schultz (eds.), Henry Sidgwick: Ethics, Psychics, and Politics. Catania: University of Catania Press.
Henry Sidgwick's Practical Ethics.Sissela Bok - 2000 - Utilitas 12 (3):361.
Schultz's Sidgwick.Anthony Skelton - 2007 - Utilitas 19 (1):91-103.
Sidgwick, Dualism and Indeterminacy in Practical Reason.David Phillips - 1998 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 15 (1):57 - 78.
Sidgwick.Bart Schultz - 2013 - In Roger Crisp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics. Oxford University Press.
Sidgwick and the Morality of Purity.Francesco Orsi - 2012 - Revue d'Etudes Benthamiennes 10 (10).
Sidgwick's problem.David M. Holley - 2002 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (1):45-65.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-02-16

Downloads
6 (#1,430,516)

6 months
1 (#1,510,037)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references