Phronesis 24 (3):230-240 (1979)

William Prior
Santa Clara University
In this paper I argue against the view of G.E.L. Owen that the second version of the Third Man Argument is a sound objection to Plato's conception of Forms as paradigms and that Plato knew it. The argument can be formulated so as to be valid, but Plato need not be committed to one of its premises. Forms are self-predicative, but the ground of self-predication is not the same as that of ordinary predication.
Keywords Plato  Theory of Forms  Third Man Argument  G.E.L. Owen
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DOI 10.1163/156852879x00144
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