In defence of modest anti-luck epistemology

In Kelly Becker & Tim Black (eds.), The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology. Cambridge University Press. pp. 173--192 (2012)
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Duncan Pritchard
University of California, Irvine

Citations of this work

Risk.Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (3):436-461.
The Modal Account of Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):594-619.
Knowledge‐How and Cognitive Achievement.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):181-199.

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