Authors
Carolyn Price
Open University (UK)
Abstract
Should moods be regarded as intentional states, and, if so, what kind of intentional content do they have? I focus on irritability and apprehension, which I examine from the perspective of a teleosemantic theory of content. Eric Lormand has argued that moods are non-intentional states, distinct from emotions; Robert Solomon and Peter Goldie argue that moods are generalised emotions and that they have intentional content of a correspondingly general kind. I present a third model, on which moods are regarded, not as generalised emotions, but as states of vigilance; and I argue that, on this model, moods should be regarded as intentional states of a kind quite distinct from emotions. An advantage of this account is that it allows us to distinguish between a mood of apprehension and an episode of objectless fear
Keywords Mood  Emotion  Intentionality  Teleosemantics  Objectless emotion
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2006
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,008
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

An Argument for Basic Emotions.Paul Ekman - 1992 - Cognition and Emotion 6 (3-4):169-200.
Pushmi-Pullyu Representations.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:185-200.
Toward a Theory of Moods.Eric Lormand - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 47 (May):385-407.
Basic Emotions, Rationality, and Folk Theory.P. N. Johnson-Laird & Keith Oatley - 1992 - Cognition and Emotion 6 (3-4):201-223.
Can There Be an Epistemology of Moods?Stephen Mulhall - 1996 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 41:191-210.

View all 6 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Emotion.Ronald de Sousa - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Fitting Anxiety and Prudent Anxiety.James Fritz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8555-8578.
The Intentionality and Intelligibility of Moods.Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):118-135.
A perceptual theory of moods.Mauro Rossi - 2021 - Synthese 198 (8):7119-7147.

View all 23 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Nonphenomenal Consciousness.Eric Lormand - 1996 - Noûs 30 (2):242-61.
Basic Moods.Craig DeLancey - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):527-538.
What Feelings Can't Do.Laura Sizer - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (1):108-135.
Towards a Computational Theory of Mood.Laura Sizer - 2000 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):743-770.
An Anti‐Essentialist View of the Emotions.Joel J. Kupperman - 1995 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (4):341-351.
Folk, Functional and Neurochemical Aspects of Mood.Paul E. Griffiths - 1989 - Philosophical Psychology 2 (1):17-32.
How is a Phenomenology of Fundamental Moods Possible?Tanja Staehler - 2007 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (3):415 – 433.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-07-25

Total views
679 ( #11,371 of 2,505,200 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #81,218 of 2,505,200 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes