Williamson on Defining Knowledge

Episteme 19 (2):286-302 (2022)
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Abstract

In his outstanding book Knowledge and its Limits, Williamson claims that we have inductive evidence for some negative theses concerning the prospects of defining knowledge, like this: knowing cannot be defined in accordance with a determinate traditional conjunctive scheme; defends a theory of mental states, mental concepts and the relations between the two, from which we would obtain additional, not merely inductive, evidence for this negative thesis; and presents an alternative definition of knowledge. Here I consider these issues and extract two relevant conclusions: Williamson's theory of states and concepts only supports the negative thesis because this theory would explain too much, since it imposes implausible necessary limitations on possible uses of concepts and linguistic expressions. So, there is no appropriate non-inductive evidence for the negative thesis. Williamson's own definition of knowledge is at risk.

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Manuel Perez Otero
Universitat de Barcelona

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References found in this work

Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Discrimination and perceptual knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.
Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (3):247-279.
Reponses to Critics.Timothy Williamson - 2009 - In Patrick Greenough & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press.

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