Philosophiques 36 (2):511-532 (2009)

Authors
Dominique Pradelle
Université Paris-Sorbonne
Abstract
L’article s’interroge sur l’unité intrinsèque des concepts d’intuition, d’évidence et de remplissement dans la pensée de Husserl : existe-t-il un concept formel d’intuition qui soit valable pour toutes les sphères d’objets possibles ? Peut-on transposer aux différents types d’essences ou de catégories d’objets le paradigme de l’intuition élaboré dans la sphère de la perception sensible ? Cette question nous conduit à analyser, chez Husserl, la structure et les modalités du remplissement et de l’intuition pour les singularités sensibles, les essences matériales et les essences mêlant sensibilité et forme catégoriale.In our paper, we ask whether or not the concepts of intuition, insight and fulfillment have an intrinsic unity in Husserl’s thought. Does a formal concept of intuition exist, which would have a validity in all possible spheres of objects ? Is it possible to transfer to the different kinds of essences the model of intuition, which has been elaborated in the sphere of sensory perception ? That problem leads us to analyze in Husserl’s thought the structure and modalities of fulfillment and intuition for sensory singularities, for material essences and for essences that are a mix of sensibility and categorical form
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DOI 10.7202/039483ar
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Edmund Husserl (1859-1938).Denis Fisette (ed.) - 2009 - Montreal: Philosophiques.

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