Perceiving Multiple Locations in Time: A Phenomenological Defence of Tenseless Theory

Topoi 34 (1):249-255 (2015)
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Abstract

It is a common claim that one concept of time, tenseless theory, is in greater conflict with how the world seems to us than the competing theories of tense theory and presentism. This paper offers at least one counter-example to that claim. Here, it is argued that tenseless theory fares better than its competitors in capturing the phenomenology in particular cases of perception. These cases are where the visual phenomenology is of events occurring together which must be occurring at different times. The commitments of matching such phenomenology in one’s ontology undermine tense theory and presentism and support tenseless theory

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Sean Enda Power
University of Leeds (PhD)

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