Philosophia 48 (2):709-725 (2020)

Krzysztof Poslajko
Jagiellonian University
The aim of this paper is to show that the interpretivist account of propositional attitudes fails even at the most plausible reading that treats this theory as a version of the deflationary approach to existence coupled with a metaphysical claim about the judgement-dependence of propositional attitudes. It will be argued that adopting a deflationary reading of interpretivism allows this theory to avoid the common charge of fictionalism, according to which interpretivists cannot maintain realism about attitudes as their theory becomes a covert form of mental fictionalism. However, as will be shown, the deflationary version of interpretivism faces a fatal dilemma: either it becomes indistinguishable from generic deflationism about the mental, or it must embrace the metaphysical thesis of judgement-dependence of propositional attitudes. The latter option leads to unacceptable epistemological consequences, as it cannot accommodate intuitions about possibility of error in attribution of attitudes. Thus, it turns out that even a subtle version of interpretivism is not a viable theory of intentional states.
Keywords propositional attitudes  fictionalism  deflationism  metaphysics of mind  interpretivism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11406-019-00155-8
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,257
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Real Patterns.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.
The Things We Mean.Stephen R. Schiffer - 2003 - Oxford University Press.

View all 28 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

How to Think about the Debate over the Reality of Beliefs.Krzysztof Poslajko - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (1):85-107.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Deflating Deflationism.Bradley Philip Armour-Garb - 1999 - Dissertation, City University of New York
Truth as a Pretense.James A. Woodbridge - 2005 - In Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 134.
Interpretation: Its Scope and Limits.U. Kriegel - 2010 - In Allan Hazlett (ed.), New Waves in Metaphysics. Palgrave-Macmillan.
Reliabilism and Deflationism.James R. Beebe - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):495 – 510.
Not All Attitudes Are Propositional.Alex Grzankowski - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy (3):374-391.
Radical Interpretation and the Problem of Asymmetry.Greg Lynch - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4):473-488.
Why Deflationists Should Be Pretense Theorists (and Perhaps Already Are).Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2010 - In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 59-77.
Attitudes Towards Objects.Alex Grzankowski - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):314-328.
Truth: The Deflationary Theory Vs. The Semantic Theory.Glen Adam Hoffmann - 2003 - Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada)


Added to PP index

Total views
28 ( #406,200 of 2,499,869 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #169,576 of 2,499,869 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes