Utilitas 9 (2):249-257 (1997)

Abstract
According to both deontologists and consequentialists, if there is a reason to promote the general happiness – or to promote any other state of affairs unrelated to one's own projects or self-interest – then the reason must apply to everyone. This view seems almost self-evident; to challenge it is to challenge the way we think of moral reasons. I contend, however, that the view depends on the unwarranted assumption that the only way to restrict the application scope of a reason for action is by restricting it to those agents whose interests or projects are involved in the reason. In fact normative theories may coherently restrict application scopes in other ways. Thus we must take seriously the possibility that the reason to promote the general happiness, although genuine, does not apply to everyone.
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DOI 10.1017/S0953820800005318
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References found in this work BETA

The View from Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 92 (2):280-281.
Structures of Normative Theories.James Dreier - 1993 - The Monist 76 (1):22-40.
Responsibility.Mark Ravizza & J. R. Lucas - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (2):306.

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