Self-Referentially Coherent Theory of Time

Quaerens Deum: The Liberty Undergraduate Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (1) (2020)
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Abstract

J.M.E. McTaggart's theory of time proports to demonstrate that there is no such thing as time. Many authors have attempted to defend, object, or rework McTaggart's arguments, however, in this paper I hold that McTaggart's arguments for the unreality of time do not hold. McTaggart's argument rests on an apparent contradiction in the A-series of time. Namely that the A-series is necessary for time and that the A-series necessarily produces a contradiction. In this paper, I attempt to show that this supposed contradiction is actually caused by incorrectly establishing the origin and direction of the descriptor of time needed to understand its progression.

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Time and Change.James Frederick William Rowe - 2017 - Philosophical Forum 48 (2):201-213.

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