[1 − p(X, z)][1 − p(y, z)]/p(y, z) if p(y, z) >

Abstract

The burden of this theorem, stated informally, is that when a hypothesis h is maximally independent of the evidence — that is, it goes wholly beyond the evidence —, then the probability p(h, e) increases when the evidence e is weakened; and hence, the weaker is the evidence, the greater is the probabilistic support.

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David Miller
Goldsmiths College, University of London

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