Abstract

There are several profoundly disturbing questions which face any substantive egalitarian theory; among them are these three. Is the goal of equal treatment compatible with pluralism, with the fact that people value and need different things? Is constant meddling and substantial interference with liberties the cost of maintaining equality? If each of the important theories of social justice makes use of a rich concept of equality, is there a distinctive sort of equality left for egalitarian theory to promote? In Chapter VII, I offer an analysis of the goal of equality in terms of the minimizing of the disparity in life prospects. This is distinguished from Rawlsian and utilitarian equality and, by way of answering the serious questions mentioned above, a new defence of equality is sketched. ;In Chapter V of Part II, the concept of desert is clarified. Claims of desert are based on what people have done, not on what they can or will do; what one deserves is an appropriate responsive attitude, e.g., gratitude, respect, sympathy, condemnation. Modes of treatment are only derivatively deserved and as such, desert is a virtue of personal relations more than a matter of social justice. In Chapter VI, the merits of meritocracies are considered. Merit is a forward-looking characteristic; it is a measure of how well one will do. Hence, merit and desert are to be contrasted. It is argued that the traditional justifications for exclusive reliance on merit--including entitlement, desert and utility--in the distribution of jobs all fail. ;I discuss, first, formal principles of justice. It is shown that at least one principle of equality is a canon of reason; to deny it is to affirm a contradiction. This formal principle of equality, however, is different from the naive relevant differences principle and the presumptive equality principle . ;The concern of Part II is with substantive principles. Market, merit and desert theories are the major opponents, in contemporary social thought, of a substantively egalitarian theory of social justice. Of course, each of these opponents is, to some degree, egalitarian and I point out in what respect. But the primary aim of this part is to show the profound difficulties that confront these alternative accounts. In Chapter IV of Part II, a pure process market theory, as found in Locke and Nozick, is discussed. The theory of rights presupposed by this market theory has fatal flaws. For example, restoration poses insuperable problems; if we can rectify injustices, the nature of our rights over property must be other than what is required for a pure process market theory. ;In this dissertation, an egalitarian theory of social justice is constructed and defended