The conceivability argument and the intuition of dualism

Diametros 24:90-106 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Kripke’s antimaterialist argument, under David Papineau’s new interpretation, is not based on assuming that the conceivability of zombies entails possibility and does not lead to the conclusion that materialism is false but rather to the conclusion that we are all in the grip of the intuitive feeling that materialism is false. Leaving it open whether or not Papineau’s interpretation of Kripke’s argument is correct, I argue here that by appealing to the intuition of dualism we can see that the conceivability of zombies is not a reliable guide to possibility

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,219

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Conceivability and the cartesian argument for dualism.James Van Cleve - 1983 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (January):35-45.
Access denied to zombies.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2008 - Unpublished (1):1-13.
Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance.George Bealer - 2002 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 71-125.
Dualism and the argument from continuity.Eric Russert Kraemer & Charles Sayward - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 37 (January):55-59.
The cogito and the metaphysics of mind.Nick Treanor - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):247-71.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-03-14

Downloads
43 (#352,595)

6 months
1 (#1,459,555)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Textbook kripkeanism and the open texture of concepts.Stephen Yablo - 2000 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (1):98–122.
Kripke's proof is ad hominem not two-dimensional.David Papineau - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):475–494.

Add more references