Rational Choice and Action Omnipotence

Philosophical Review 111 (1):1 (2002)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A theory of rational choice is a theory of how an agent should, rationally, go about deciding what actions to perform at any given time. For example, I may want to decide whether to go to a movie this evening or stay home and read a book. The actions between which we want to choose are perfectly ordinary actions, and the presumption is that to make such a decision we should attend to the likely consequences of our decision. It is assumed that these decisions must be made in the face of uncertainty regarding both the agent’s initial situation and the consequences of his actions.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Rational choice and action omnipotence.John L. Pollock - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):1-23.
Rational choice theory.William J. Goode - 1997 - American Sociologist 28 (2):22.
The Paradox of Omnipotence.John Francis Zeis - 1980 - Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania
Rational choice theory's mysterious rivals.Dennis Chong - 1995 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 9 (1-2):37-57.
Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations.Edward Francis McClennen - 1990 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Living with reason.Ross Poole - 1992 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):199 – 217.
The promise and limitations of rational choice theory.Stanley Kelley - 1995 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 9 (1-2):95-106.
Logika, wszechmoc, Bóg.Ryszard Kleszcz - 2012 - Filo-Sofija 12 (19).
Omnipotence Again.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2000 - Faith and Philosophy 17 (1):26-47.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-09-07

Downloads
20 (#656,247)

6 months
2 (#668,348)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

John Pollock
University of Edinburgh

Citations of this work

Why Take Both Boxes?Jack Spencer & Ian Wells - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1):27-48.
Options and the subjective ought.Brian Hedden - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):343-360.
Agential Free Choice.Melissa Fusco - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (1):57-87.

View all 14 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:321-332.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.
Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.John Pollock - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (1):131-140.

View all 9 references / Add more references