Neural machinery and realization

Philosophy of Science 71 (5):997-1006 (2004)
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Abstract

The view that the relationship between minds and brains can be thought of on the model of software and hardware is pervasive. The most common versions of the view, known as functionalism in philosophy of mind, hold that minds are realized by brains

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Tom Polger
University of Cincinnati

References found in this work

Meaning and Mental Representation.Robert Cummins - 1990 - Mind 99 (396):637-642.
Realization and mental causation.Sydney Shoemaker - 2001 - In Carl Gillett & Barry Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press.
Physicalism: The Philosophical Foundations.Jeffrey Stephen Poland - 1994 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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