Abstract

In Plato's Republic, the Analogy of the Sun famously points out that as the Idea of the Good relates to the knowable Forms so does the Sun to the visible things. Yet, no one has ever questioned whether the consequences claimed to be caused by the sun – among them especially the vital genesis of all physical things – can, based on Plato's philosophy, actually be caused by the material body of the sun. Taking this as a point of departure, the present article looks into whether one can reveal more of the Analogy, just as Socrates himself frequently emphasises the incompleteness of his presentation. The article thus develops a series of detailed arguments to propose a differentiation of each analogical relation into two subrelations, which imply a transcendent principle and an immanent representation of this principle on both sides of the Analogy. Implementing this differentiation bears the potential to solve existing tensions within the interpretation of Republic VI and VII, it allows for further systematic considerations about, among others, the Good and the Beautiful and it may help to contextualise Plato's Analogy historically.