Towards Model-Based Model of Cognition

The Reasoner 3 (6):5--6 (2009)
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Abstract

Models are the ultimate results of all (scientific, non-scientific, and anti-scientific) kinds of cognition. Therefore, philosophy of cognition should start with the following fundamental distinction: there are models, and there are means of model-building. Laws of nature and theories are useful only as a means of model-building. If it's true that models are the ultimate results of cognition, then shouldn't we try reordering the field, starting with the notion of model? In this way, couldn't we obtain a unified and more productive picture - a model-based model of cognition?

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Karlis Podnieks
University of Latvia

References found in this work

Models in Science (2nd edition).Roman Frigg & Stephan Hartmann - 2021 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Theories: Tools versus models.Mauricio Suárez & Nancy Cartwright - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 39 (1):62-81.

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