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The Planning Theory of Law I: The Nature of Legal Institutions [Book Review]
Philosophy Compass 8 (2):149-158 (2013)
Abstract
This paper and its companion (“The Planning Theory of Law II: The Nature of Legal Norms”) provide a general introduction to Scott Shapiro’s Planning Theory of Law as developed in his recent book Legality. The Planning Theory encompasses both an account of the nature of legal institutions and an account of the nature of legal norms. This first paper concerns the account of legal institutions. The second concerns the account of legal norms.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Courage, cowardice, and Maher’s misstep.Brent G. Kyle - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):565-587.
Uncommon Legislative Attitudes: Why a Theory of Legislative Intent Needs Nontrivial Aggregation.David Tan - 2021 - Ratio Juris 34 (2):139-160.
References found in this work
Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency.Michael Bratman - 1999 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
I Intend that We J.Michael Bratman - 1999 - In Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency. Cambridge University Press. pp. 142–161.
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