Philosophical Scepticism about Moral Obligation

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 67 (1):175 - 212 (1993)
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Abstract

How much of our ordinary moral thought can we make sense of using a model of practical reason in which value is seen as subjective? There are already problems with showing strength of will not to be irrational. If social obligations are conceived of instrumentally as in a tradition running from Hobbes through Hume to Mackie, and if we employ our strength of will to sacrifice our individual projects in favor of them, the problems become insuperable

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