Leibniz's Argument for Primitive Concepts

Journal of the History of Philosophy 41 (3):329-341 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

On its face, Leibniz's argument for primitive concepts seems to imply that unless we can analyze non-primitive concepts into their primitive constituents, we cannot grasp them. This implication, together with Leibniz's belief that we do conceive of some non-primitive concepts, entails that we can analyze some non-primitive concepts into their primitive components. However, Leibniz claims elsewhere that we are incapable of doing this. To resolve this inconsistency, I argue that, for Leibniz, grasping a concept is not an all-or-nothing affair; instead we possess concepts in degrees. When reinterpreted in line with this, Leibniz's argument can avoid the inconsistency

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Primitive arts and crafts.Roderick Urwick Sayce - 1933 - New York,: Biblo & Tannen.
A (leibnizian) theory of concepts.Edward N. Zalta - 2000 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 3:137-183.
Is Evil Really an Ontological "Primitive"?Siobhan Nash-Marshall - 2005 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 79:157-171.
Leibniz on Concept and Substance.Michael K. Shim - 2006 - International Philosophical Quarterly 46 (3):309-325.
Leibniz on Hobbes’s Materialism.Stewart Duncan - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (1):11-18.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
89 (#175,742)

6 months
10 (#135,615)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Dennis Plaisted
University of Tennessee, Chattanooga

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references